Market Reaction to Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure by Grewal, Jyothika et al.
Market Reaction to Mandatory
Nonfinancial Disclosure
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Grewal, Jody, Edward J. Riedl, and George Serafeim. "Market
Reaction to Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure." Harvard Business
School Working Paper, No. 16-025, September 2015.
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:22565791
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP









Working Paper 16-025 
  
Working Paper 16-025 
 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Jody Grewal, Edward J. Riedl, and George Serafeim 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may 




Market Reaction to Mandatory 
Nonfinancial Disclosure  
  
Jody Grewal 
Harvard Business School 
Edward J. Riedl 
Boston University 
George Serafeim 
Harvard Business School  
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657712 
 
 




Harvard Business School 
 
Edward J. Riedl  
Boston University 
 
George Serafeim * 









Abstract: This paper examines the equity market reaction to events associated with the passage 
of a directive in the European Union (EU) mandating increased nonfinancial disclosure, which 
affected firms listed on EU exchanges or having significant operations in the EU.  The mandated 
disclosures relate to firms’ environmental, social, and governance performance.  Using a cross-
country sample, we first document an on average negative market reaction to events increasing 
the likelihood of passage for this regulation, consistent with equity investors anticipating net 
costs with the directive’s passage for most firms. Exploiting cross-sectional variation, we then 
predict and document a more negative market reaction for firms having: (i) low pre-directive 
nonfinancial disclosure levels, consistent with investors anticipating these future disclosures to 
reveal worse-than-expected news; (ii) weaker performance on nonfinancial issues, consistent 
with expectations for these firms to incur future costs to internalize current externalities; and (iii) 
lower ownership by institutional asset owners, consistent with such investors demanding further 
disclosures than mandated by the directive.  The average market reaction for firms with superior 
nonfinancial performance and disclosure in our sample is positive, suggesting that investors 
expect net benefits from the passage of the directive for these firms.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the equity market reaction to events associated with the adoption 
of mandatory nonfinancial disclosure.  Specifically, we examine the passage of European Union 
(EU) Directive 2014/95 on disclosure of nonfinancial information.  This directive requires 
affected companies to disclose in their annual management report information on policies, risks, 
and outcomes regarding environmental matters, social and employee aspects, respect for human 
rights, anticorruption and bribery issues, and diversity in their board of directors.  The directive 
applies to firms either (i) listed on EU exchanges or having significant operations in the EU, (ii) 
defined to be “large” (i.e., having 500 or more employees), or (iii) designated as public-interest 
entities by EU Member States due to the nature of their activities, size, or number of employees.  
This directive is intended to provide investors and other stakeholders with a more comprehensive 
picture of firm performance. 
We assess the equity market’s perception of the anticipated net costs or benefits 
associated with this directive by investigating the market reaction to three key events associated 
with its adoption.  Following prior research employing event study methodology to market-wide 
regulation (e.g., Zhang 2007; Armstrong et al. 2010), our dependent variable is the firm’s 
cumulative five-day abnormal stock return, centered on the event dates, and aggregated across 
the three sample events.  To isolate market effects attributable to the directive, we adjust our 
treatment firms’ stock return with a comparable return for control firms, identified via a 
matching algorithm using the same country and sector, and having the nearest congruence in size 
and price-to-book ratio.  Thus, the difference between the market return for the treatment firm 
and that for the matched control firm is our measure of abnormal returns.  Our final sample 
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includes a broad cross-section of companies from around the world that are covered by the 
directive.     
We first examine the on average (i.e., univariate) market reaction to these events.  If 
equity investors perceive the benefits from this mandated nonfinancial reporting will exceed the 
costs, we predict a positive market reaction around events expected to increase the likelihood of 
the directive’s passage.  Alternatively, if equity investors perceive the benefits from this 
regulation to be less than the costs, then we predict a negative market reaction around such 
events.  Benefits include potential increases in information relevant to assessing firm 
performance and improved management practices; costs include release of proprietary 
information, compliance costs, and adoption of management practices not beneficial to 
shareholders.  We find an on average negative abnormal return surrounding adoption of this 
directive, robust across several methods and samples.  We interpret this as consistent with 
investors anticipating net costs on average from the directive.   
We then conduct our primary analyses, which exploit cross-sectional variation in this 
abnormal return.  Specifically, we estimate a multivariate model including firm, industry, and 
country characteristics as determinants of the abnormal stock price reactions for the treatment 
firms, providing four principal insights.  First, we document a more negative stock price reaction 
for firms having low disclosure levels of nonfinancial information prior to the directive.  We 
interpret this as consistent with the directive increasing the likelihood of disclosure of worse-
than-expected news, as well as anticipated proprietary or political costs for such firms.  Related, 
we find a more negative stock price reaction for firms in industries exhibiting the highest levels 
of nonfinancial disclosure.  We interpret this result as suggesting that firms belonging to such 
industries with clear nonfinancial disclosure leaders will face heightened costs of differentiation.  
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Second, we document a more negative stock price reaction for firms with weak governance.  We 
interpret this result as consistent with investors perceiving the benefit from any future disclosures 
to be lower for weak-governance firms, potentially reflecting anticipated lower quality 
nonfinancial disclosures for such firms.  Third, we find a more negative stock price reaction for 
firms with weak environmental performance.  We interpret this as consistent with investors 
anticipating that such firms―which are generating negative externalities―will be likely to incur 
future costs as they are forced to internalize those externalities.  Finally, we find a more positive 
stock price reaction for firms having high levels of shareholder ownership from institutional 
asset owners such as pension funds and insurance companies.  We interpret this result as 
consistent with greater demand for this nonfinancial information by this type of investor, as prior 
research documents such asset owners among the strongest proponents of mandatory 
nonfinancial disclosure (Serafeim 2015).  Finally, we document on overall positive market 
reaction for those firms exhibiting strong nonfinancial performance and disclosure before the 
regulation, suggesting considerable heterogeneity in the market response to these events.    
These cross-sectional findings are robust to a variety of analyses, including: (i) 
alternative matching algorithms, such as replacing the country-sector matching with a more 
restrictive country-industry matching; (ii) excluding firms domiciled in the US, the country 
having the largest percentage of our sample observations; (iii) including only EU firms; and (iv) 
including the percentage of shares held by socially responsible investment (SRI) funds.  Finally, 
consistent with prior event studies on market-level regulatory changes, we conduct an analysis to 
identify confounding events that could bias our results; we fail to find such evidence. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the effects and investor relevance of 
nonfinancial disclosures.  Prior research provides evidence that voluntary nonfinancial disclosure 
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has economic effects (Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012; Cheng et al. 2014) and that investors seek 
nonfinancial data (Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim 2011).  Other research finds that regulations in 
particular countries, which mandated the disclosure of nonfinancial information, led to increases 
in the quantity and quality of nonfinancial information (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015).
1
  We build 
on these papers by providing evidence that the equity market perceived that mandating the 
provision of nonfinancial information would (on average) lead to net costs for affected firms; in 
particular, we find that the equity market perceived these net costs to be concentrated in firms 
with weaker nonfinancial disclosure and performance before the regulation.  In contrast, for 
firms that have made investments to improve their performance on environmental, social and 
governance issues and to provide disclosures around them, investors expect net benefits.  We 
conclude that investors expect an emphasis on nonfinancial issues to benefit some firms and to 
disadvantage other firms.   
Section II provides the background and hypothesis development.  Section III presents our 
research design.  Section IV describes our sample selection and descriptive statistics.  Section V 
presents our primary results, and Section VI our sensitivity analyses.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background  
In recent decades, there has been spectacular growth in the number of firms disclosing 
nonfinancial information.  For example, over the past twenty years the number of companies 
issuing sustainability or CSR reports has increased from less than 50 to more than 6,000 
(Serafeim 2014).  Factors contributing to this increase in disclosure include pressure from 
                                                          
1
  We are also related to papers examining how nonfinancial measures and performance relate to other aspects of 
the firm’s information environment (e.g., earnings quality in Kim et al. 2012) or operating decisions (e.g., 
corporate tax avoidance in Hoi et al. 2013). 
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stakeholder groups on companies to disclose information relating to the environmental and social 
impact from their operations, as well as the governance procedures that ensure that such 
considerations are taken into account (Delmas and Toffel 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009).   
In addition, there has been increased investor interest in nonfinancial data (Eccles, Krzus, 
and Serafeim 2011).  For example, heightened government regulation around environmental 
issues has been shown to contribute significantly to increased non-regulated disclosure of 
environmental liabilities (Barth, McNichols, and Wilson 1997).  Similarly, investor and 
regulatory concerns around environmental issues are associated with increased narratives for 
environmental disclosures (Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998).  Prior research also documents a 
positive relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure consistent 
with broader predictions of voluntary disclosure theory (Clarkson et al. 2008).  The same line of 
research finds that firms with unfavorable prior year media coverage are more likely to make soft 
claims of environmental commitments, which are not readily verifiable, consistent with socio-
political theories that stress the importance of organizational legitimacy (Clarkson et al. 2008). 
The disclosure of nonfinancial information also has been shown to have economic 
effects.  Prior research documents that firms with superior environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) performance have better access to finance and lower capital constraints, in part due to the 
higher ESG disclosure (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim 2014).  Related, other studies document 
that firms issuing sustainability reports exhibit a lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; El 
Ghoul et al. 2011). 
While most of the preceding research is built on firms’ voluntary disclosure practices, 
more recently several mandatory nonfinancial disclosure regulations have emerged.  Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2015) finds that firms in four countries (China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa) 
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not only increase disclosure, but also seek assurance of those disclosures and adopt reporting 
guidelines that increase comparability of disclosed information.  Other research reveals that 
mandatory disclosure programs have forced companies to improve their operating performance 
relating to the environment (Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack 2010) or food and water 
safety (Bennear and Olmstead, 2008; Jin and Leslie, 2003).  However, no research examines 
investor perceptions of the expected costs and benefits to the announcement of regulations 
mandating such nonfinancial disclosures.  
Prior research in accounting investigates market reactions to the announcement of 
mandated financial disclosure regulations.  Much of this research focuses on equity market 
reactions to particular accounting standards in the US, such as fair value accounting required 
under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 115 (Beatty et al. 1996; Cornett et 
al. 1996), and employee stock-based compensation under SFAS 123 (Dechow et al. 1996).    
However, our setting relates more closely to other research examining the market 
reaction to regulation with broader implications, regarding either the regulation’s effect on the 
nature of information being mandated, or the set of relevant firms affected by it.  Two primary 
examples are the adoption of International Reporting Standards (IFRS) and passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  Regarding IFRS, Armstong et al. (2010) examines the EU stock 
market reaction to events affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption.  The paper documents an (on 
average) significantly positive market reaction to these collective events, as well as cross-
sectional variation revealing a more positive reaction for firms having lower quality pre-adoption 
information and higher pre-adoption information asymmetry (suggesting anticipated 
improvements in information quality under IFRS), and a more negative reaction for firms 
domiciled in code law countries (suggesting anticipated concerns over enforcement of IFRS in 
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those countries).  Related, Joos and Leung (2013) examines the stock price reaction of US firms 
to IFRS adoption events.  The paper documents a marginally positive overall US market 
reaction, as well as more positive abnormal returns for firms operating in industries where IFRS 
is already widely adopted by non-US peer firms, for larger and more liquid firms, and for firms 
with high foreign institutional ownership.  Joos and Leung (2013) interprets these results as 
consistent with investors reacting more positively to IFRS adoption when it is expected to result 
in convergence benefits. 
Our paper is also related to several studies examining the market reaction to events 
affecting passage of SOX.  Jain and Rezaee (2006) and Li et al. (2008) find significantly positive 
abnormal stock returns associated with legislative events increasing the likelihood of SOX’s 
passage, concluding that investors perceived SOX to be overall net beneficial.  In contrast, 
Zhang (2007) documents negative cumulative abnormal returns for US firms and foreign firms 
complying with SOX around similar events, concluding SOX imposes net costs on complying 
firms.   
Collectively, these studies infer investor perceptions of the net costs or benefits 
associated with the regulation by examining the equity market reaction to events leading to its 
adoption.  Accordingly, we follow this research, and use the equity market reaction to events 
affecting passage of mandatory nonfinancial disclosures in the EU to assess the expected net 
costs or benefits associated with this regulation, as well as predictable cross-sectional variation.  
Finally, we note that Leuz (2007), in evaluating the studies examining the market reaction to 
events affecting passage of SOX, argues it is difficult to attribute the event date market reactions 
solely or principally as investor response to passage of the studied regulation.  This is because 
the SOX regulation was imposed on virtually all publicly-traded US firms, making it difficult to 
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identify a natural control group to remove market-wide effects that are unrelated to the 
regulation.  Similar concerns can affect studies relating to the passage of IFRS, due to its wide-
spread impact on publicly-traded firms in the adopting markets.  In contrast, the directive 
mandating nonfinancial disclosure in our setting applies to a subset of EU-listed companies; as 
discussed later, this affords more flexibility in identifying a suitable control group of comparable 




The mandated disclosure of nonfinancial information could lead to both costs and 
benefits from an equity investor standpoint.  Benefits include the increased availability of 
information relevant both for valuation and monitoring purposes.  Specifically, better 
information can improve either the prediction of firms’ future performance (i.e., expected cash 
flows) and/or lead to clearer expectations regarding the inherent risks facing the firms.  This can 
lead to a reduced costs of capital through lower information risk (Easley and O’Hara 2004), and 
thus a positive stock price reaction.  In addition, better information can improve the ability of 
investors to monitor firms on dimensions potentially having cash flow implications (e.g., 
environmental performance); this, too, would generate a positive stock price reaction.  Another 
mechanism through which investors could benefit is if mandatory disclosure of nonfinancial 
information leads firms to improve their operational efficiency, such as through reduced energy 
consumption and waste generation, improved product quality and customer service, or better 
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employee recruitment, retention and development.
2
  Collectively, these changes would lead to a 
positive market reaction to the increased likelihood of the regulation’s passage.    
However, investors will react negatively to the regulation if (on average) the anticipated 
costs outweigh the expected benefits.  One source of costs includes those related to the direct 
preparation, dissemination, and assurance of the new information.  However, an EU impact 
assessment study indicates that “the cost of a full mandatory reporting obligation could therefore 
be roughly estimated in a range varying between €33,000 and €604,000 per year per company,” 
with the actual number being a function of the company’s size.3  The seemingly limited 
materiality of these costs, relative to the scale of the affected firms, suggests they are unlikely ex 
ante to be a primary driver of any observed negative market reaction to this regulation.  Another 
potential cost relates to proprietary costs of disclosure.  Specifically, if firms are forced to 
disclose information expected to be harmful to their competitiveness, this too would lead to a 
negative market reaction.  This is possible, if the mandated disclosures convey competitive 
advantages to other firms, allowing them to (in expectation) emulate such activities.  A third 
potential source of costs is political costs.  To the extent investors anticipate that disclosure of 
this information allows governments, regulators or NGOs to pressure firms to invest their capital 
on projects perceived as negative net present values to shareholders, investor reaction around the 
announcement of the regulation will be negative.  
In summary, the disclosure regulation is likely to generate both costs and benefits.  As the 
net effect is difficult to predict ex ante, we do not make a directional univariate prediction. 
   
                                                          
2
  Indeed, the recent regulation suggests that “a strategic approach to CSR is increasingly important for 
competitiveness, as it can bring benefits in terms of risk management, cost savings, access to capital, customer 
relationships, human resource management and innovation capacity.”  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0127.  
3




However, we expect cross-sectional variation in how the regulation is perceived to be net 
beneficial or costly.  Accordingly, we examine variables that could affect the relative magnitude 
of costs and benefits.  Our main experimental variables focus on firms’ level of disclosure and 
performance on nonfinancial issues.  We predict that firms disclosing low levels of nonfinancial 
disclosure will have a more positive stock price reaction, if investors expect that they will receive 
value relevant information from these firms in the future.  However, if investors expect that such 
firms will be forced to (i) disclose news more negative than expected (such as that relating to 
their environmental impact, employee relations, product safety, (ii) to reveal proprietary 
information, or (iii) to incur political costs as a result of increased disclosure, then we expect a 
more negative stock price reaction.  Similarly, we predict a more positive stock price reaction for 
firms with poor nonfinancial performance if investors expect that these firms in doing so will 
improve their nonfinancial―and thus future financial―performance.  Alternatively, if investors 
expect these firms will be forced to improve their performance on nonfinancial issues to the 
detriment of financial performance, then we predict a more negative stock price reaction. 
We also hypothesize that the investor reaction to passage of mandatory nonfinancial 
disclosures will be a function of several other firm characteristics.  First, we predict that firms 
with higher institutional ownership will have more positive stock price reactions, reflecting 
higher demand for information from such investors.  Prior research suggests that institutional 
investors, particularly asset owners such as large pension funds and investment arms of insurance 
companies, have been a driving force behind increases in these disclosures (Serafeim 2015).  
Second, we predict that firms with large unrecognized assets (such as brands, human capital, 
intellectual capital, or social capital) will exhibit more positive stock price reactions as the 
12 
 
nonfinancial disclosures will be informative about assessing the value of these assets.  Third, we 
predict that smaller firms to have more negative stock price reactions due to proportionately 
higher costs of compliance for these firms as the regulation could be proportionately more costly.  
We also expect several key industry characteristics to explain cross-sectional variation in 
investor reaction to this mandated nonfinancial disclosure.  First, we predict that industries with 
firms having high levels of nonfinancial disclosure will exhibit more negative stock price 
reactions, as firms in such industries will be forced to converge to the leading company in terms 
of disclosure, leading to greater costs to achieve these higher levels of disclosure.  Second, we 
predict that industries with higher rents will face higher political costs, and therefore a more 
negative stock price reaction as they will face pressure to share profits with other stakeholders.  
Third, we predict that industries with a large environmental impact will have more negative 
stock price reactions, as these firms will face incremental pressure to limit their environmental 
impact thereby incurring costs.   
Finally, we expect several country characteristics to explain cross-sectional variation in 
investor reaction.  To the extent that investors perceive benefits from the future disclosures, we 
predict more positive stock price reactions in countries where institutions ensure the disclosure 
of high quality information.  Second, we predict that firms in countries with stronger regulatory 
regimes will exhibit more negative stock price reactions, as these firms will be more likely to 
face political costs.  In addition, given that a few countries had already adopted disclosure 
regulations for nonfinancial information (such as China, Denmark, France, India, Malaysia, and 
South Africa, we expect investor reactions to be smaller in those countries (i.e., less negative in 




III.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
Dependent Variable  
 Consistent with prior research examining the market reaction to events affecting the 
likelihood of passage for mandatory nonfinancial disclosures, our dependent variable is CARi, 
the cumulative abnormal return for firm i to events identified as affecting the likelihood of 
passage for the directive mandated increased nonfinancial disclosures in the EU.   
Several research design choices relating to our dependent variable warrant discussion.  
First, consistent with prior research, our return measure is accumulated over days (–2, +2), 
where day 0 is the event date.  Use of a five-day span ensures that we capture any leakage 
regarding the regulation prior to its official release date, as well as ensuring sufficient time for 
the equity markets to impound the anticipated effects of the events into firms’ stock prices.  
Because our sample spans equity markets from different countries, this mitigates concerns of 
differences in overall levels of market efficiency.  We note that results are robust to alternatively 
using a 3-day (–1, +1) return. 
Second, following prior research (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010), our analyses focus on the 
aggregation of market reactions across the identified events.  That is, we draw our inferences 
from assessment of the market reactions to all events aggregated together, as opposed to 
assessing each event individually, because the passage of this directive resulted from a process 
that evolved over several years.  Restated, we view these events as collectively affecting the 
likelihood of regulation’s passage, with the equity market’s reaction to any particular event and 
its effect on passage of the directive being conditional on the collective responses from previous 
events.  In addition, aggregation across the events reduces noise that may occur in any particular 
14 
 
event; for example, due to the release of other non-regulation information not fully removed 
from the observed market return.        
Third, a critical research design choice in event studies―particularly those examining 
regulatory events affecting a large population of firms―is the identification of a benchmark 
return to appropriately remove any non-regulatory news coinciding on the examined event dates 
to derive an “abnormal” stock return.  To derive the benchmark return, we assign each treatment 
firm to a corresponding control firm, matched on the basis of country, sector, market 
capitalization, and price-to-book ratio.  Matching on country of domicile eliminates any market 
reaction coinciding on our examined event dates that is attributable to country-specific news 
unrelated to our examined regulation.  Similarly, matching on sector eliminates any sector-
specific economic news reflected in the market reaction on our event dates.  Finally, matching on 
market capitalization and price-to-book controls for general effects attributable to the 
information environment, risk, or growth that coincides with firms having a similar size and 
price-to-book ratio.  Thus, for each event, we calculate the difference between the observed 5-
day stock return for treatment firm i, after removing the corresponding 5-day return for the 
control firm j.  For each firm i, we then aggregate these differences across the three identified 
sample events, to derive our firm-specific CAR.
4
   
 
Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 To assess cross-sectional variation in the market response to our identified events, we 
estimate the following regression: 
CARi =  α1 + β1ESG_Discl_Scorei  
                                                          
4
  We note that our results are unchanged to additionally matching on the variable ESG_Discl_Score, which 
measures the quantity of the firm’s ESG disclosures.  This matching procedure helps to address potential self-
selection of firms into the amounts of non-financial disclosures being provided. 
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+ β2Gov_Scorei + β3Social_Scorei + β4Envir_Scorei  
+ β5AssetMgri + β6AssetOwneri  
+ β7MTB_TopQi + β8MCap_BotQi  
+ β9Ind_MaxESGDisclm + β10Ind_AvgROAm + β11EnvWeightm  
+ β12CommonLawk + β13RegQualk + β14NationalRegk + εi   (1) 
The dependent variable is CARi, the cumulative abnormal return for firm i aggregated across the 
three identified events affecting passage of the directive.   
 The experimental variables are defined as: 
ESG_Discl_Scorei a Bloomberg variable that scores from 0 – 100 and measures the quantity 
of ESG disclosures made by firm i in 2013;
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Gov_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the quality of firm 
i’s governance processes and structure in 2013;6 
                                                          
5
  Bloomberg calculates an ESG (environmental, social, and governance) Disclosure score to quantify a company’s 
transparency in reporting ESG information.  Environmental data relate to emissions, water, waste, energy and 
operational policies around environmental impact.  Examples include the level of scope 1, 2 and 3 carbon 
emissions, the amount of waste discarded, percentage of water usage from recycled sources, the amount of 
electricity used, environmental fines, and the total amount of materials recycled.  Social data relate primarily to 
employees, products and impact on communities.  Examples include employee turnover, percentage of women in 
workforce, lost time incident rate, community spending, number of customer complaints, and number of 
suppliers audited based on social criteria.  Governance data relate to board structure and function, firm’s political 
involvement, and executive compensation.  The data are collected from any available corporate disclosure such 
as annual reports, sustainability reports, and other public corporate presentations.  This score is based on 100 out 
of 219 raw data points that Bloomberg collects, and is weighted to emphasize the most commonly disclosed data 
fields.  The weighted disclosure score is normalized to range from zero (for companies that do not disclose any 
ESG data) to 100 for those companies that disclose every data point collected.  Bloomberg accounts for industry-
specific disclosures by normalizing the final score based only on a selected set of fields applicable to the industry 
type.  For example, “Total Power Generated” is counted into the disclosure score of utility companies only.  Past 
research has shown that these disclosure scores, among all ESG related data fields, are the ones that attract the 
most attention by investors (Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim 2011). 
6
  MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) ESG Research provides environmental, social and governance 
ratings, screening and compliance tools to investors wanting to integrate nonfinancial factors into their 
investment processes.  Analysts first determine the key nonfinancial issues affecting each industry that have the 
highest potential material impact on a company’s financial performance, and assign a weight (indicating relative 
importance) to each key issue.  Using a combination of company-disclosed and third-party sources, analysts 
score each company on each key issue on a scale from 0 (worst) to 10 (best).  This score evaluates the 
companies’ relative risk exposure and performance as compared to best practice in the industry.  On an as-
needed basis, analysts contact company management following preliminary research to request specific data that 
is missing from the analysis.  The weighted average of the key issue scores are aggregated to provide each 
company with an overall ESG performance score, as well as three disaggregated performance scores (one each 
for environmental, social, and governance).  Company ratings are generally updated on an annual cycle when all 
companies in its industry are reviewed; however, individual reviews and ratings changes can occur when a 
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Social_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the performance of 
firm i in relation to human capital, health and safety, products and 
services, and supply chain issues in 2013; 
Environ_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the performance of 
firm i in relation to energy and climate change, natural resource 
consumption and waste management issues in 2013; 
AssetMgri the percentage of outstanding shares of firm i held by asset managers 
defined as investment advisors, mutual funds and hedge funds (calculated 
using 2013 Bloomberg data); 
AssetOwneri the percentage of outstanding shares of firm i held by asset owners defined 
as pension funds, insurance companies and bank trusts (calculated using 
2013 Bloomberg data); 
MTB_TopQi an indicator variable equaling one if firm i is in the top quartile of market-
to-book ratio, and zero otherwise;  
MCap_BotQi an indicator variable equaling one if firm i is in the bottom quartile of 
market capitalization, and zero otherwise; 
Ind_MaxESGDisclm the maximum level of ESG disclosure in 2013 across all firms in firm i’s 
industry m; 
Ind_AvgROAm the average level of ROA in 2013 across all firms in firm i’s industry m; 
EnvWeightm an MSCI variable measured in 2013 that ranges from 0 – 100% and scores 
an industry m by taking into account both its contribution, relative to all 
others, to the negative impact on the environment; and the timeline within 
which we expect that financial risk for companies in the industry would be 
expected to materialize; 
CommonLawk an indicator variable equaling 1 if country k (the country of firm i’s 
domicile) is a common law country, and zero otherwise; 
RegQualk country k’s 2013 World Bank rating of its regulatory quality, which 
captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development; and 
NationalRegk an indicator variable equaling 1 if country k (the country of firm i's 
domicile) already mandates similar nonfinancial disclosures in 2013 as 
those being mandated in the examined directive, and zero otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
company is involved in an extraordinary “ESG Event” with substantial negative social or environmental impact.  
MSCI ESG coverage has increased from 250 firms in 1999 to over 6,000 firms in 2014. 
17 
 
We make the following cross-sectional predictions.  Regarding firm-level variables, if 
investors expect that firms with higher levels of ESG disclosure and performance prior to the 
mandated regulation will incur incrementally higher net costs (net benefits), then we predict the 
coefficients on ESG_Discl_Score, Govern_Score, Soc_Score, and Environ_Score to be negative 
(positive).  If institutional investors demand more nonfinancial information relative to that 
mandated by the regulation, we predict the coefficients on Asset_Mgr and Asset_Owner to be 
positive.  If the nonfinancial disclosures are expected to provide information particularly relevant 
to those firms having significant unrecognized intangible assets, we predict the coefficient on 
MTB_TopQ to be positive.  If smaller firms are expected to incur relatively higher proportional 
costs of implementation due to the mandated disclosure regulation, we predict the coefficient on 
MCAP_BotQ to be negative.
7
 
Regarding industry-level variables, if the costs of converging in terms of disclosure are 
expected to be highest in industries having firms with high pre-regulation nonfinancial 
disclosures, the predicted coefficient on Ind_Max_ESGDiscl is negative.  If industries exhibiting 
strong economic performance are more likely to face increased political costs to force the sharing 
of profits with other (nonequity) stakeholders, we predict the coefficient on Ind_Avg_ROA to be 
negative.  Finally, if the mandated nonfinancial disclosures are expected to force industries 
having large environmental impacts to incur incrementally higher costs to limit this impact, the 
predicted coefficient on EnvWeight also is negative.  
                                                          
7
  We note that our predictions relate to the absolute level of a firm’s performance or disclosure, not its level 
relative to its industry.  We follow this process, because industry benchmarking could add measurement error 
and noise in our estimates as it would not be consistent with investor expectations.  Consider the following 
example: a carbon tax regulation would affect a coal company with the best environmental performance (firm A) 
more than it would affect a technology firm with the worst environmental performance (firm B), since even the 
most environmentally-conscious coal company has higher carbon emissions than the least-environmentally 
conscious technology firm.  However, industry-adjusting environmental performance would likely create the 
impression that firm A is less affected by the regulation than firm B, which is incorrect.  
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Regarding country-level variables, to the extent that investors perceive benefits from the 
future disclosures to be more concentrated in firms domiciled in countries with a common law 
tradition, we predict a positive coefficient on CommonLaw.  Further, we predict a negative 
coefficient on RegQual, as these firms will be more likely to face political costs.  Finally, we 
expect investor reactions to be smaller in countries that have already adopted disclosure 
regulations for nonfinancial information, as the expected net costs are likely lower; this leads to a 
positive predicted coefficient for NationalReg.  
 
IV.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND EVENTS 
Sample Selection 
Table 1 presents our sample selection.  Our initial sample consists of Bloomberg’s 2014 
population of 15,133 firms with ESG coverage.  Bloomberg has the widest coverage among data 
providers in terms of ESG disclosure, and its ESG analysts cover the largest companies in the 
world (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015).  We exclude firms missing any of the event returns; we also 
exclude firms domiciled in South Africa, which all focus on commodities, due to likely 
confounds in inferences.
8
  This yields a sample 12,162 available firms. 
We separate this latter group into those affected versus unaffected by the directive.  Firms 
affected by the directive are identified using the Proposal for the Directive (Proposal) on non-
financial reporting, obtained from the EUR-Lex database.  The Proposal specifies that the new 
rules apply only to companies (both listed as well as other public-interest entities, such as banks 
and insurance companies) having over 500 employees, operating in any of the 28 EU member 
                                                          
8
  Specifically, the available publicly-traded South African firms in our set focus on natural resource extraction, 
particularly gold.  Gold prices exhibit high volatility on our event dates (with average stock returns of almost –
15% for these firms), leading to the likely confound in inferences for this subgroup.   
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countries, and having either a balance sheet total of €20 million or revenues of €40 million.9  The 
Proposal further stipulates that companies listed on an EU stock exchange and meeting the size 
threshold are affected by the new ruling even if they are registered outside of the EU.  Using 
Worldscope data (supplemented with hand-collected data on employee count), we identify 2,417 
firms falling under the scope of the Directive; this constitutes our treatment sample.   
The remaining 9,745 firms (12,162 less 2,417) defines the sample of potential control 
firms.  To match treatment with control firms, we employ a matching algorithm as follows.  We 
identify treatment and control firm pairs headquartered in the same country and operating in the 
same Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector, and then find the closest match in 
terms of total market capitalization and price-to-book ratio.  Our matching process requires exact 
matching on country and sector membership and then minimizes the distance between the 
treatment and control firms in terms of size and price-to-book ratio.  We first delete 364 
treatment firms due to inability to obtain a matched control firm in the same country-sector pair, 
leaving a final sample of 2,053 pairs; this is the group used for our univariate analyses.  We then 
impose the additional data requirements for our cross-sectional tests, leading to a matched 
sample of 1,249 treatment/control firm pairs.  Missing data on the ESG performance pillars is the 
primary cause for the reduced sample.  
Table 2 presents the distribution of our treatment observations.  Panel A presents the 
frequency by country, and Panel B presents that by sector.  The panels provide two primary 
insights.  First, the country and sector distribution of the sample firms prior to matching in 
Column (1) is quite similar to that after matching for the univariate analyses in Column (2).  
Second, while the sector distribution for the sample firms having necessary data for the cross-
                                                          
9
  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
companies and groups: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0207.  
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sectional analyses in Column (3) is similar to the other two samples, the country distribution for 
the cross-sectional sample now attains a larger percentage weighting in the US.  This reflects the 
greater availability of data for US firms; we explore the robustness of our results to excluding the 
US observations in a later sensitivity analysis.  Focusing on the sample for the cross-sectional 
analyses in Column (3), the primary countries represented are Japan (5.5%), United Kingdom 
(19.4%) and the US (48.2%), and the primary sectors represented are consumer discretionary 
(19.5%), financials (18.5%), and industrials (17.9%).  
 
Sample Events 
We identify three events during 2011– 2014 that we assess as having a major effect on 
the likelihood that nonfinancial reporting would be mandated in the EU.  To identify potential 
events, we (i) examine press releases and public document listings by the European Parliament, 
the European Commission, and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group; and (ii) 
search Dow Jones News Retrieval using the terms “nonfinancial reporting”, “social and 
environmental information”, “EU nonfinancial legislation” and “EU mandatory nonfinancial 
disclosure.”  This search provides an initial listing of 20 events.10  We verified each event’s 
timing, content, and likely directional effect on the likelihood of mandating nonfinancial 
disclosure in the EU.  We eliminated events confirming earlier events, those relating to broader 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, and those relating to nonfinancial 
disclosure.
11
  This process leads to three events that we assess as impacting the likelihood of 
nonfinancial reporting being mandated in the EU.  
                                                          
10
  The listing of these twenty events is available upon request. 
11
  For example, the European Commission released a report on October 15, 2011 entitled “A renewed EU Strategy 
for Corporate Social Responsibility.”  In addition to specifying the Commission’s commitment to propose 
legislation on the mandated disclosure of ESG information by EU firms, the report also discusses over 40 other 
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The first event is April 16, 2013, when the EU Commission presented the Proposal for 
the Directive to amend existing accounting legislature with the intent of improving the disclosure 
of ESG matters by certain large companies.  Under the proposal, large companies (defined as 
those having 500 or more employees, and either total assets of €20 million or sales revenue of 
€40 million) would be required to disclose relevant material ESG information in their annual 
reports.  While mandatory nonfinancial reporting had been under discussion in the EU prior to 
this event date, this date marks the first clear commitment by the EU to require companies to 
disclose this information.
12
  We also note that while this event consists of the presentation 
(versus passage) of the Proposal, it occurs after considerable efforts to understand the need for 
the legislation, solicit stakeholders’ feedback regarding the legislation, and outline the 
framework and legal elements of the legislation.  Further, the EU Commission rarely presents a 
Proposal unless there is clear support for its adoption.  Our second event date is February 26, 
2014, when the European Parliament and the European Council reached an agreement on the 
Proposal.  Our third event date is April 15, 2014, when the European Commission adopted the 
Proposal.
13
  Both latter events relate to the Proposal’s adoption.  We view all three sample events 
as increasing the likelihood of the EU adopting mandatory nonfinancial reporting requirements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
commitments from the Commission relating to improving corporate ESG practices and established guidelines. 
As this event relates to both reporting and non-reporting ESG issues, it is eliminated from our sample events. 
12
  As stated in the Proposal for the Directive, the proposal reflects the findings of over two years’ worth of 
consultations, dialogues and impact assessments that the Commission maintained with interested parties, 
including preparers, users and non-governmental organizations.  A number of dialogues lead to this proposal, 
including: (1) in 2011 and 2012, two public consultations on the disclosure of non-financial information by EU 
companies, with an overall majority of stakeholders supporting the need to improve the current legislative 
framework; (2) in 2011 and 2012, five Expert Group meetings with stakeholders and Member States’ 
representatives took place, where details concerning the legislative proposal were discussed; and (3) in 2010 and 
2011, two impact assessments were undertaken by the Commission to identify issues concerning the inadequate 
transparency of nonfinancial information. 
13
  We note that the Proposal was officially passed into law on September 29, 2014, when it was adopted by the EU 
Member States in the European Council.  We exclude this event, as it is a formality that simply confirms the vote 
to adopt the Proposal on April 15, 2014.  As indicated in the European Commission’s press release of April 15, 
2014 states: “Following today’s adoption by the European Parliament, the Council is expected to formally adopt 
the proposal in the coming weeks”. 
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In addition, we searched for events that would decrease the likelihood of the EU adopting 
mandatory nonfinancial reporting requirements to allow investigation of events with opposite 
stock price reactions to the above; however, we were unable to find such events. 
 
Confounding News  
Common to event studies, we examine whether particular non-directive related news is 
issued systematically across our three identified events, to mitigate concerns of confounds 
regarding observed market reactions.  We search the US and European editions of the Wall Street 
Journal, including “World Markets” articles, as well as the US and European editions of Reuters, 
Bloomberg and the European edition of the Financial Times, for news unrelated to mandatory 
EU nonfinancial reporting during our event windows.  We search for news on the day preceding, 
day of, and day after the event.  We filter our search to include only headline listings, headline-
only content and page-one stories.  For our first event date (April 16, 2013), we note that the 
terrorist attacks at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013 likely negatively affected the returns 
of (particularly) US firms.  We further note that on April 15, 2013 gold prices fell by over 9% to 
a two-year low, which we expect to negatively impact the returns of firms in the mining industry.  
For our third event date (April 16, 2014), we note that banks operating in the EU are likely 
negatively affected by the adoption of several landmark banking reforms on April 16, 2014.
14
 
For these global news events that could potentially confound the attribution of our events 
to the observed market reaction, we pay particular attention to the abnormal event returns and the 
                                                          
14
  In addition, a bias could arise if (i) around the events firms release their earnings numbers and (ii) earnings 
surprises are systematically higher or lower for treatment firms compared to control firms.  Accordingly, we also 
calculate earnings surprise (E_SURP) for each firm and include it as an additional control variable in our cross-
sectional model.  E_SURP is measured as the difference between the actual and last consensus forecast divided 
by absolute actual earnings in 2013 and 2014, and averaged across the two years.  The coefficient on E_SURP is 
insignificant; further, all other results are unchanged. 
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appropriateness of the matched control firms.  For the first event date with potentially 
confounding news of the Boston Marathon bombing, we note that the average abnormal return 
for the 605 US treatment firms (that is, the difference between the treatment and control firm 
return) is 0.31%.  Similarly, the average abnormal return for European banks on the third event 
date (with the potentially confounding news of the EU bank reform) is –0.14%.  Thus, the 
matching appears to mitigate any extreme non-regulatory market effects attributable to either the 
bombing or the banking reform.   
Finally, we note a potential confound with the first event that leads us to exclude all firms 
from South Africa from our primary sample.  We observe starkly declining gold prices around 
our first event, evidenced in the 41 treatment firms belonging to the metals and mining industry 
(GICS 151040) having large negative returns (–13%).  We investigate related treatment firms 
with absolute abnormal returns above 1% on this event date to confirm the appropriateness of the 
control firms.  Of note, the seven South African precious metal mining and exploration 
companies are initially matched with steel production firms, which share the same GICS 151040.  
Due to the lack of suitable control firms to eliminate effects due to the dramatic change in gold 
price (versus the regulation effects we wish to capture), we exclude the South African firms from 
our analyses.  
  
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Univariate Analyses 
We first examine the overall market reaction to the three events to assess whether 
investors worldwide perceive mandated nonfinancial reporting to be, on average, net beneficial 
or costly.  Table 3 presents the cumulative five-day raw stock return, centered on event dates, 
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and aggregated across our three events.  Panel A presents the mean raw event returns, size and 
growth characteristics of our treatment and control samples for three comparisons: (i) before 
matching in Columns (1) – (2); (ii) after matching but before imposing cross-sectional data 
requirements in Columns (3) – (5); and (iii) after matching and imposing cross-sectional data 
requirements in Columns (6) – (8).  We first document that the average market reaction is 
negative and similar in magnitude prior to matching: –0.0256 for the treatment firms in Column 
(1) (N = 2,471), and –0.0260 for the control firms in Column (2) (N = 9,745).  However, once we 
impose our matching, we find that the treatment firms exhibit significantly more negative market 
reactions to the cumulated three events.  Specifically, using the matched firms for the univariate 
analyses (N = 2,053 firm pairs), we find a reaction of –0.0250 for the treatment firms in Column 
(3), and –0.0171 for the control firms in Column (4); the difference of –0.0079 (i.e., 0.79%) in 
Column (5) is significantly negative (t-stat = 2.74).  Similar results obtain using the matched 
firms for the cross-sectional analyses (N = 1,249 firm pairs), with the difference of –0.0071 
(0.71%) in Column (8) again significantly negative (t-stat = 2.60).   
We note that our treatment firms appear to have larger market capitalizations relative to 
the control firms.  For example, the average market capitalization (end of 2013) before matching 
is $7,782 ($1,538) million for the treatment (control) firms.  However, this difference is 
considerably attenuated as we move across the three sample groupings: for example, in the cros-
sectional sample, the average market capitalization is $12,556 ($9,279) million for the treatment 
(control) firms.  In addition, the matching appears to eliminate differences in market-to-book 
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ratios across the treatment and control samples: the difference is insignificant once we impose 
the matching.  This provides some validation of the control firms as appropriate benchmarks.
15
  
Panel B then presents results of regressing the cumulative 5-day raw event returns on 
treatment versus control firms, after directly controlling for market capitalization and the market-
to-book ratio.  Thus, to the extent the matching does not completely eliminate market effects 
attributable to the size or market-to-book, this analysis explicitly controls for such effects.  Of 
note, we find an on average negative market reaction of –1.01% (coefficient for Treatment = –
0.0101, t-stat = 2.68) for the treatment firms under the matched sample before imposing the 
cross-sectional data requirements.  Similarly, we find a significant negative market reaction of –
1.20% (Treatment = –0.0120, t-stat = 2.72) for the treatment firms under the matched sample 
after imposing the cross-sectional data requirements.   
Overall, these results are consistent with the stock market perceiving that adoption of mandatory 
nonfinancial disclosures under the proposed regulation would lead to net costs on average.  We 




Table 4 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) for 
the variables used in our cross-sectional analyses of Equation (1), which is estimated using 
                                                          
15
  To further mitigate the effect of size on our estimates we include it as a control in our multivariate regressions in 
Panel B.  Moreover, in additional analysis reported later in the paper we impose stricter filters that force size 
differences to be minimized further. 
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observations for which data are available for all three events (N = 1,249 for country-sector 
matching).  All variables are measured as of 2013 calendar year-end.
16
   
Focusing on Panel A, on average the sample treatment firms have nonfinancial disclosure 
scores of 30.187 (ESG_Discl_Score).  As previously discussed, ESG_Discl_Score ranges from 0 
– 100 and measures the quantity of ESG disclosures a firm makes.  Prior research reveals that 
ESG disclosure has increased over time (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015), that firms with scores 
above 10.5 have above average levels of ESG disclosure in the total ESG Bloomberg universe as 
of 2013, and that firms with scores above 20.9 have above average levels of ESG disclosure 
among ESG-disclosers in the total ESG Bloomberg universe as of 2013.  The panel also reveals 
average governance performance of 6.429 out of 10 (Govern_Score), social performance of 
4.627 out of 10 (Soc_Score), and environmental performance of 5.473 out of 10 
(Environ_Score).  The MSCI scores range from 0 – 10; in the total MSCI sample, firms with 
scores above 4.7 are considered to have above average levels of ESG performance as of 2013.  
The average firm’s shares outstanding are mostly owned by asset managers (Asset_Mgr = 
75.979), such as banks, hedge funds, mutual funds and investment advisors, while less than 4% 
are held by asset owners (Asset_Owner = 3.884), such as pension funds and insurance 
companies.  The industry leaders of nonfinancial disclosure have an average score of 56.885 out 
of a possible 100 (Ind_Max_ESGDiscl), as compared to the average nonfinancial disclosure 
score of 30.187 (ESG_Discl_Score).  The industry return on assets is 5.069% (Ind_Avg_ROA).  
Finally, 73% of sample firms are domiciled in common law countries (CommonLaw mean = 
0.728), 6% operate in countries having existing nonfinancial disclosure regulation in place 
                                                          
16
  Our first event is before the 2013 calendar year-end while the latter two events are after.  Measuring our 
variables in 2012 does not change our results but it restricts our sample because of a larger number of missing 
MSCI and Bloomberg data.  Over time, both data providers have expanded their coverage. 
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(National Reg = 0.055), and the average World Bank Regulatory Quality score (RegQual) is 
1.413 out of 4.  
In Panel B, the correlations reveal (consistent with expectations) that CAR is significantly 
positively correlated with Govern_Score, Asset_Mgr, Asset_Owner, and MTB_TopQ.  As 
expected, CAR also is negatively correlated with Ind_Max_ESG_Discl and RegQual.  The 
correlations between CAR the remaining variables are insignificant.
17
   
Table 5 presents the cross-sectional results based on Equation (1); standard errors are 
clustered by country.  Focusing on the firm-level experimental variables, we find a significantly 
positive coefficient on ESG_Discl_Score (0.00030, t-stat = 2.53), and a significantly positive 
coefficient on Govern_Score (0.00311, t-stat = 2.71).  These are consistent with the equity 
market perceiving that firms having high ESG disclosure and stronger governance performance 
will be able to institute the regulation more efficiently and cost-effectively.  Economically, a 
one-standard deviation increase in ESG_Discl_Score (Govern_Score) is associated with an 
increased market reaction of 0.49% (0.84%).  We also find a significantly positive coefficient on 
AssetOwner (0.00104, t-stat = 2.70), consistent with investors perceiving that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have higher demand for nonfinancial information.  A one-standard 
deviation increase in AssetOwner is associated with an increased abnormal return of 0.64%.  
Finally, we find a marginally significantly positive coefficient on MTB_TopQ (0.00925, t-stat = 
1.61), consistent with investors expecting higher net benefits for firms with more intangible 
assets.  The coefficients on the remaining firm-level variables are insignificant. 
 Turning to the industry- and country-level variables, we find a significantly negative 
coefficient on Ind_Max_ESGDiscl (–0.00090, t-stat = 2.60), consistent with investors expecting 
                                                          
17
  While the panel reveals several larger correlations between the experimental variables (e.g., 0.548 correlation 
between CommonLaw and Asset_Mgr), these do not appear to affect our regression results: for example, VIFs for 
Table 5 are all less than 1.82. 
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higher net costs for firms operating in industries having “leaders” with high nonfinancial 
disclosures.  Economically, a one-standard deviation increase in Ind_Max_ESGDiscl is 
associated with a decreased market return of –0.79%.  We also find a significantly negative 
coefficient on RegQual (–0.03484, t-stat = 2.42).  This suggests equity market participants 
reacted more negatively to mandated nonfinancial reporting for firms operating in countries with 
stronger regulatory regimes, consistent with investors in these firms expecting relatively higher 
political costs resulting from the mandate.  The corresponding one-standard deviation effect of 
RegQual is a more negative return of 0.98%.  The coefficients on the remaining industry- and 
country-level variables are insignificant. 
 Finally, because our above analyses appear to suggest an overall negative reaction to the 
passage of these mandated nonfinancial disclosures, we estimate a regression to assess the 
reaction for the strongest sample firms.  Following Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 54), we redefine all 
variables from Equation (1) as indicator variables equaling one when the firm exhibits the “lower 
quality” condition.  As an example for the firm-level variables, we define an indicator variable to 
equal one when the firm has below median environmental pillar score (and thus weaker 
environmental reporting); as an example for the country-level variables, we define an indicator to 
equal one when the firm is listed in a code law country (and thus has weaker overall 
enforcement).  All control variables are similarly defined, and thus capture the effects for those 
firms in the weakest reporting conditions.  Critically, this provides a particular interpretation of 
the intercept: it now captures the average market response to our sample events for the strongest 
reporting firms, i.e., those firms in common law countries, having national nonfinancial 
disclosure regulations, with environmental, social, and governance reporting that is above 
median, etc.  Untabulated results reveal that the intercept now equals to 0.0388 (t-stat = 1.69); 
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this suggests that the average reaction for the very best firms is 3.88%.
18
  This provides an upper 
bound, and critically suggests that high quality firms exhibit a positive reaction to the mandated 
nonfinancial regulation.  
Overall, the results from the cross-sectional analyses suggest that investors expect higher 
net costs from the mandated nonfinancial disclosures for firms with lower ESG performance, 
weaker governance, lower ownership by asset managers, in industries with firms having high 
nonfinancial disclosure, and in countries with high implementation and formation of regulation.  
  
VI.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to confirm the robustness of our results.  First, 
we impose stricter matching requirements upon our sample.  Second, we examine alternative 
matching algorithms.  Third, we exclude firms domiciled in the US, or include only firms 
domiciled in the EU.  Fourth, we calculate for a smaller sample the percentage of shares held by 
socially responsible investment (SRI) funds and include this variable in our cross-sectional 
model.  Finally, we assess the impact of the individual disclosure components of environmental, 
social, and governance (as opposed to the composite ESG disclosure measure used in the 
primary analyses).   
  
Stricter Matching Requirements  
As discussed, our primary analyses match firms exactly on country and sector, and 
further use propensity score matches on market capitalization and market-to-book ratios.  This 
                                                          
18
  As an alternative (and more conservative) measure, we subtract from the 3.88% the estimated reaction for firms 
operating in industries having the strongest ESG disclosure scores (the value of which is –1.22%).  This indicates 
a net market reaction of 2.66%; which provides a more conservative (though, still positive) measure of the 
market reaction for the strongest firms.  
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matching procedure seeks to isolate the changes in investor expectations reflecting the perceived 
financial consequences from the announcement of the disclosure regulation (our treatment effect) 
by differencing away contemporaneously occurring changes in investor expectations that 
correspond to firms domiciled in the same country, operating in the same sector, and having a 
similar size and growth profile.  That is, the selection of matching criteria trades off the precision 
of matching the treatment and control firms (which increases the likelihood of differencing away 
effects unrelated to the regulation we wish to examine) with the reduction in statistical power 
that typically arises due to more restrictive matching criteria leading to a smaller sample size.  
Table 3 previously highlighted that our primary matching procedure reduced differences in both 
market capitalization and market-to-book ratio between the treatment and control firms; 
however, while differences in market-to-book for the matched pairs were insignificant, those in 
market capitalization remained significant (see Column (8) of Table 3).   
To further ensure that the average effect we document is not driven by remaining 
differences in firm size across the treatment and control firms, we conduct an additional analysis 
that further limits the matched firms by restricting the difference between the market 
capitalization of the treatment and the control firm pairs to no more than $5 billion.  This leads to 
a reduced sample of 746 matched pairs, with the following empirical results.  Table 6 Panel A 
(which corresponds to Table 3 Panel A presenting average differences in the market reaction to 
the three cumulative events) reveals that we continue to find a more negative return for treatment 
firms (–1.91% in Column (1)) relative to control firms (–1.22% in Column (2)), with the 
difference of –0.70% significantly negative in Column (3) (t-stat = 2.75).  Panel B (which 
corresponds to Table 3 Panel B presenting average differences controlling for market 
capitalization and market-to-book) further shows in Column (1) that the coefficient on Treatment 
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remains significantly negative (–0.0098, t-stat = 2.62).  Both results confirm a more negative 
stock price reaction for our treatment firms to the sample events.  Finally, Panel C (which 
corresponds to Table 5) presents the cross-sectional results in Column (1), which are similar to 
those in our primary analyses.  Specifically, we continue to find significantly positive (negative) 
coefficients on ESG_Discl_Score, Govern_Score, Asset_Owner, and MTB_TopQ 
(Ind_Max_ESGDiscl, and RegQual); in addition, we find a marginally significantly negative 
coefficient on NationalReg.     
We then conduct a second analysis using an alternative matching algorithm.  Our primary 
analyses include a sample matched on sector (and country, market capitalization, and market-to-
book).  We alternatively match treatment and control firms using this same algorithm, now 
matching on GICS industry as opposed to sector.  Industry (with 67 classifications) is defined 
more narrowly than sector (with 10 classifications); accordingly, it provides a more precise 
economic match of treatment and control firms, but (due to the reduced availability of suitable 
control firms) also leads to a reduced sample of 857 firm pairs.  Results remain consistent with 
our primary analyses.  In Table 6 Panel A, we continue to find in Column (6) a significantly 
more negative return for the treatment firms (–0.81%, t-stat = 2.14).  In Panel B, we continue to 
find in Column (2) a significantly negative coefficient on Treatment (–0.0093, t-stat = 2.92).  In 
Panel C, we continue to find in Column (1) significantly positive (negative) coefficients on 
ESG_Discl_Score and Asset_Owner (RegQual).  However, in contrast to our primary analyses, 
the coefficients on Govern_Score, MTB_TopQ, and Ind_Max_ESGDiscl are now insignificant.  
In addition, we find that the coefficient on EnvScore is now significantly positive, suggesting 
firms with worse environmental performance have more negative stock price reactions consistent 
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with investors expecting these firms to reveal bad news in the future and having to internalize 
some of the externalities generated. 
Several insights may explain differences between this latter analysis and the findings in 
the primary analysis.  Regarding Ind_Max_ESGDiscl, the country-industry matched sample has 
higher representation of extractive, industrial and hospitality firms relative to the country-sector 
match in the primary analysis.
19
  Firms in these industries have higher average nonfinancial 
disclosure levels (mean ESG_Discl_Score = 33.39) relative to other industries 
(ESG_Discl_Score = 21.24); however, firms in these industries have similar average industry 
leader disclosure levels (mean Ind_Max_ESGDiscl = 60.01) as other industries (mean 
Ind_Max_ESGDiscl = 60.27), resulting in smaller differences between the average level of 
nonfinancial disclosure and the average industry leader’s level of nonfinancial disclosure, when 
representation from these industries is higher.  Specifically, for the sample of country-sector 
matches, the average ESG_Discl_Score is 29.66 and the average Ind_Max_ESGDiscl is 60.57 
resulting in an average difference of 30.91 (60.57 – 29.66); this difference falls to 24.47 for the 
sample of country-industry matches, due to the average ESG_Discl_Score increasing to 34.91 
and the average Ind_Max_ESGDiscl falling to 59.38 when representation from Oil, Gas and 
Consumable Fuels, Machinery and Hotels, Restaurants and Leisure, Mining & Metals increases. 
Thus, we conjecture that higher representation by firms in industries that have smaller 
differences between average disclosure levels and industry leader disclosure levels attenuated the 
negative stock price reactions since there is both less pressure to converge and lower costs to 
converge to the industry leader’s level of disclosure. 
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  Specifically, from the country-sector to the country-industry matched sample, representation increased by: 1.41% 
for Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels; 1.3% for Machinery; 0.77% for Hotels, Restaurants and Leisure; and 0.63% 
for Mining & Metals. 
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Regarding the now insignificant coefficient on Govern_Score, we examine country 
membership for the country-sector and country-industry samples and find higher representation 
of US firms in the current country-industry matched sample (67%) relative to the country-sector 
matched sample of the primary analysis (52.8%).  As governance concerns likely are lower 
among investors in US firms, we conjecture that higher representation of strong governance US 
firms in the country-industry sample attenuates the positive coefficient on Govern_Score in the 
country-industry matched sample. 
 
Variations in Matching Algorithm 
Next, we implement several alternative matching algorithms.  Our matching process in 
the primary analyses uses replacement.  This minimizes the probability of bias as a control firm 
that appears similar to multiple treatment firms can be used multiple times; thus, the order of 
matching is irrelevant in a matching process with replacement.  In addition, matching with 
replacement allows us to maximize the available firm pairs in the analysis.  To assess the 
robustness of our results, we alternatively implement a country-sector match without 
replacement.  The sample (as expected) decreases significantly by 69% to 390 firm pairs.  All 
results remain qualitatively unchanged.  The average stock price reaction for treatment firms is 
more negative by –0.90%, relative to control firms (significant at the 1% level).  Untabulated 
cross-sectional results continue to reveal significantly more negative stock price reactions for 
firms with lower levels of ESG disclosure, governance performance, environmental 
performance, and shares outstanding held by asset owners. 
Given that our matching process identifies similar firms operating in the same sector (or 
industry), we next assess the sensitivity of our results to firms that are industrially diversified.  
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Such firms may result in suboptimal matching, if the market reactions reflect operations in 
segments not related to that used to match with the treatment firm.  Accordingly, we exclude 
firms with more than 50% of their sales outside their primary industry.  This decreases the 
sample from 1,249 to 793 matched pairs, with inferences that are similar to our primary analysis. 
Specifically, treatment firms exhibit a significantly more negative stock price reaction of –
0.80%.  Cross-sectional analyses again reveal significantly more negative returns for firms with 
lower levels of ESG disclosure, governance performance, and environmental performance. 
 Finally, our matching process requires one-to-one matching between treatment and 
control firms; that is, for each treated firm we match one control firm.  Implementing one-to-
multiple matching (i.e., having one treatment matched to two or more control firms) can provide 
better estimates under certain conditions.  Our results also are unchanged. 
 
Excluding US Firms 
Table 2 Column (3) reveals that US-domiciled firms comprise almost one-half (48.2%) of 
our primary cross-sectional sample.  To assess the robustness of our results to this sample 
characteristic, we next exclude the US firm-pairs, leading to a reduced sample of 647 matched 
pairs.  Table 6 Panel A reveals that we continue to find in Column (9) a significantly more 
negative market reaction for the treatment firms relative to the control firms (difference of 
1.79%, t-stat = 4.12).  Table 6 Panel B further reveals in Column (3) that the coefficient on 
Treatment remains significantly negative (t-stat = 2.77), reflecting an incremental negative 
market reaction to the event dates of 2.28% for treatment firms.  Both results confirm a more 
negative reaction for treatment firms, even in a sample excluding US firms.
20
  The relatively 
                                                          
20
  Further, we note that the seemingly larger stock price reaction for the sample of non-US firms appears 
principally driven by treatment firms.  Specifically, the treatment firms now exhibit an average stock price 
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more negative stock price reaction for the non-US firm sample potentially reflects that (i) US 
firms likely have a smaller portion of their operations in the EU (with broader exposure either to 
US or other international markets) and/or (ii) they have proportionately smaller financial listing 
in the EU (given the prominence of US capital markets).  As such, the US firms likely bear 
relatively fewer costs from the proposed EU nonfinancial disclosure regulation.  
 Finally, the cross-sectional analysis for the non-US matched sample, presented in Table 6 
Panel C, presents results largely similar to the main analysis.  Specifically, Column (3) reveals 
significantly positive coefficients on ESG_Discl_Score, Govern_Score, Asset_Owner and 
MTB_TopQ.  The coefficient on Ind_Max_ESGDiscl is now insignificant.  In addition, the 
coefficient on RegQual also is now insignificant, likely reflecting (as a country-level variable) 
that the coefficient in the main results is heavily influenced by the inclusion of the US firms.  
Moreover, we now find that the coefficient on Soc_Score is significantly positive, suggesting 
firms with worse performance on social dimensions have more negative stock price reactions.   
  
Excluding non-EU Firms 
 Given that the regulation we examine is implemented in the European Union, one might 
expect the regulation to have a greater effect on EU firms.  For example, there could be stricter 
enforcement for EU firms, as well as the disclosure regulation being interpreted by investors as a 
signal of increased regulation in the EU around ESG issues.  Accordingly, we next exclude non-
EU firms; the sample is now 491 firms.  Untabulated results are very similar to those in Table 6 
Panel C column (3), where we exclude US firms.  Specifically, we again find significantly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reaction of –3.42% (see Column (7) of Table 6 Panel A) versus –2.22% in the primary control sample (see 
Column (6) of Table 3 Panel A); a difference of 1.20%.  In contrast, the control firms now exhibit an average 
price reaction of –1.63% (see Column (8) of Table 6 Panel A) versus –1.51% in the primary analysis (see 
Column (7) of Table 3 Panel A), a difference of only 0.11%. 
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positive coefficients on ESG_Discl_Score, Govern_Score, Asset_Owner and MTB_TopQ.  The 
coefficients on Ind_Max_ESGDiscl and RegQual are insignificant.  The coefficient on Soc_Score 
is again significantly positive.   
 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Funds 
 We investigate the potential for a clientele effect to determine whether the market 
response differs depending on if investors have specific guidance to source ‘green’ or ‘socially 
responsible’ investments.  Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds explicitly include 
nonfinancial considerations in investment decisions.  For example, such funds may selectively 
invest in environmentally-sound firms or firms with good employment practices, or avoid certain 
industries altogether, such as tobacco, gambling and defense.  We expect that firms having 
higher SRI fund ownership will exhibit more positive stock price reactions, reflecting higher 
demand for nonfinancial information from such investors.  We obtain the listing of all mutual 
funds classified as SRI funds from Bloomberg, and match these to the Thomson Reuters Mutual 
Fund Holdings database.  Since this latter database consists of US mutual fund holdings of US 
stocks only, our analysis is limited to US firms.  For our cross-sectional sample of US firms (N = 
602) we calculate the percentage of shares held by SRI funds (PctSharesSRI) and include this 
variable in our cross-sectional model.  In untabulated results, we continue to find significantly 
positive coefficients on ESG_Discl_Score, Govern_Score, Asset_Owner and 
Ind_Max_ESGDiscl.  In addition, the coefficient on PctSharesSRI is significantly positive, 
consistent with the predicted higher demand for mandatory nonfinancial disclosures from this 




Separate Analysis of ESG Disclosure Components  
Our primary analyses measure ESG disclosure as the composite index of disclosure 
across environmental, social and governance issues.  We do not simultaneously include separate 
variables capturing the individual disclosure levels of environmental, social and governance (as 
we do with the performance levels – i.e., Govern_Score, Soc_Score, and Environ_Score) due to 
high multicollinearity across the disclosure levels.  Specifically, the univariate correlations 
between the disclosure variables ranges between 0.51and 0.82. 
However, to assess their individual impact upon observed market reactions, in 
untabulated analysis we include each disclosure level individually.  We find significantly 
positive coefficients on both environmental (0.00024, t-stat = 2.17) and governance disclosure 
(0.00047, t-stat = 2.42) levels; this is consistent with the previously discussed positive coefficient 
on the aggregated disclosure (ESG_Discl_Score).  In contrast, we find a positive but insignificant 
coefficient on the level of social disclosure (0.00013 t-stat = 1.33). 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 This paper examines market perceptions of mandated nonfinancial disclosure.  
Specifically, we examine the equity market reaction to three aggregated events (occurring during 
2013–2014), which we assess as increasing the likelihood of regulation mandating nonfinancial 
disclosure for certain affected firms (principally, those with operations and/or financial listings in 
the European Union). To identify the market reaction attributable to the regulation, we 
difference the observed stock returns for our treatment firms with that for control firms matched 
by country, sector, market capitalization, and price-to-book ratio.  This matching process should 
remove equity market changes attributable to non-regulation factors. 
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We first document an on average negative market reaction to these three events.  We 
interpret this as consistent with the equity market anticipating net costs associated with the 
regulation for most firms.  We then conduct cross-sectional analysis to understand the drivers of 
this negative reaction.  We present evidence of a more negative reaction for firms having lower 
quantity ESG disclosure, lower performance on nonfinancial issues (particularly environmental 
and governmental performance), or lower proportion of ownership by institutional asset owners.  
We interpret these results as consistent with the equity market anticipating these future 
disclosures to reveal worse-than-expected news for firms providing lower quantities of ESG 
disclosure, future costs to internalize externalities for firms with low ESG performance, and 
demand for further disclosure beyond that mandated by the directive for firms with a higher 
percentage of institutional asset owners.  These findings are robust to alternative matching 
procedures for the pairing of treatment and control firms to calculate abnormal returns to the 
three events, and to excluding US-domiciled firms (the largest country represented in the 
sample).  Overall, we conclude that the equity market perceived that this regulation mandating 
the provision of nonfinancial information would lead to net costs for affected firms, and that 
these net costs would be concentrated in firms with weaker nonfinancial disclosure and 
performance prior to the regulation.  In contrast, for firms with strong nonfinancial performance 
and disclosure investors expect net benefits as evidenced by positive abnormal stock returns 
around the passage of the regulation.  Future research can examine changes in financial 
performance, and variation in disclosure quality, as the regulation takes effect. 
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CARi the cumulative abnormal return for firm i to the aggregated three events 
identified as affecting the likelihood of passage for the directive 
mandating increased nonfinancial disclosures in the EU. 
 
Experimental Variables: Firm-Level 
 
ESG_Discl_Scorei a Bloomberg variable that scores from 0 – 100 and measures the quantity 
of ESG disclosures made by firm i in 2013. 
Gov_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the quality of firm 
i’s governance processes and structure in 2013. 
Social_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the performance of 
firm i in relation to human capital, health and safety, products and 
services, and supply chain issues in 2013. 
Environ_Scorei a MSCI variable that scores from 0 – 10 and measures the performance of 
firm i in relation to energy and climate change, natural resource 
consumption and waste management issues in 2013. 
AssetMgri the percentage of outstanding shares of firm i held by asset managers 
defined as investment advisors, mutual funds and hedge funds (calculated 
using 2013 Bloomberg data). 
AssetOwneri the percentage of outstanding shares of firm i held by asset owners defined 
as pension funds, insurance companies and bank trusts (calculated using 
2013 Bloomberg data). 
MTB_TopQi an indicator variable equaling one if firm i is in the top quartile of market-
to-book ratio, and zero otherwise. 
MCap_BotQi an indicator variable equaling one if firm i is in the bottom quartile of 
market capitalization, and zero otherwise. 
 
Experimental Variables: Industry-Level 
 
Ind_MaxESGDisclm the maximum level of ESG disclosure in 2013 across all firms in firm i’s 
industry m. 
Ind_AvgROAm the average level of ROA in 2013 across all firms in firm i’s industry m. 
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EnvWeightm an MSCI variable measured in 2013 that ranges from 0 – 100% and scores 
an industry by taking into account both its contribution, relative to all 
others, to the negative impact on the environment; and the timeline within 
which we expect that financial risk for companies in the industry would be 
expected to materialize. 
 
Experimental Variables: Country-Level  
 
CommonLawk an indicator variable equaling 1 if country k (the country of firm i’s 
domicile) is a common law country, and zero otherwise. 
RegQualk country k’s 2013 World Bank rating of its regulatory quality, which 
captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
NationalRegk an indicator variable equaling 1 if country k (the country of firm i's 
domicile) already mandates similar nonfinancial disclosures in 2013 as 








Panel A.  Identification of Available Firms 
 
# of firms 
Bloomberg population (for 2014)        15,133  
Less: South African firms            260  
Less: missing required information for matching          2,711  
Available firms        12,162  
 
 
Panel B.  Matching of Treatment and Control Firms 
 
Treatment Control Total 
Available firms 2,417  9,745  12,162  
Less: unmatched from propensity score matching  364  7,692  8,056  
   Matched Sample: Univariate Analysis  2,053  2,053  4,106  
 
Country-Sector Matching 
Less: missing cross-sectional data information  804  804  1,608  
   Matched Sample: Cross-sectional Analysis  1,249  1,249 2,498  
    
This table presents the sample selection process.  Panel A presents the available firms.  Panel B 
presents the derivation of the univariate and cross-sectional treatment and control firm samples 











(N = 2,053) 
Cross-Sectional  
After Matching 











(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A.  Frequency by Country 
Australia 77 3.2 75 3.6 61 4.9 
Austria 49 2.0 10 0.5 4 0.3 
Belgium 16 0.6 4 0.2 3 0.2 
Bermuda 7 0.3 3 0.2 3 0.2 
Brazil 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Canada 5 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Chile 1 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
China 5 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Denmark 55 2.2 40 1.9 15 1.2 
Finland 77 3.2 56 2.7 14 1.1 
France 150 6.2 123 6.0 54 4.3 
Germany 242 10.0 222 10.7 55 4.4 
Greece 17 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Hong Kong 3 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Indonesia 2 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Ireland 21 0.9 3 0.2 1 0.1 
Israel 2 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Italy 131 5.4 109 5.3 35 2.8 
Japan 80 3.3 77 3.7 69 5.5 
South Korea 2 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Luxembourg 12 0.5 3 0.2 0 0.0 
Malaysia 1 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Mexico 2 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Netherlands 68 2.8 55 2.7 21 1.7 
Norway 69 2.9 59 2.9 13 1.0 
Portugal 34 1.4 9 0.4 1 0.1 
Russia 3 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Singapore 4 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Spain 78 3.2 20 1.0 10 0.8 
Sweden 122 5.1 113 5.8 36 2.9 
Switzerland 19 0.8 14 0.7 10 0.8 
Turkey 1 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
United Kingdom 436 18.0 436 21.1 242 19.4 
United States 622 25.7 622 30.1 602 48.2 









(N = 2,053) 
Cross-Sectional  
After Matching 











(1) (2) (3) 
Panel B.  Frequency by Sector 
Energy 125 5.2 99 4.8 72 5.8 
Materials 222 9.2 143 7.0 101 8.1 
Industrials 569 23.5 511 24.8 223 17.9 
Consumer Discretionary  449 18.6 410 19.9 243 19.5 
Consumer Staples 164 6.8 115 5.6 77 6.2 
Health Care 139 5.8 122 5.9 87 7.0 
Financials 338 14.0 305 14.8 231 18.5 
Information Technology 288 12.0 266 13.2 148 11.9 
Telecommunication Services 39 1.6 17 0.8 13 1.0 
Utilities 84 3.5 65 3.2 54 4.3 
Total 2,417 100.0 2,053 100.0 1,249 100.0 
    
This table presents the frequency distribution of observations by country (Panel A) and sector 
(Panel B).  Within each panel, Column (1) presents the distribution of the treatment observations 
before imposing any data requirements.  Column (2) presents the distribution of the treatment 
and matched control observations before imposing any cross-sectional data requirements.  
Column (3) presents the distribution of the treatment and matched control observations after 






Panel A.  Average Effects 

















 (N = 2,417) (N = 9,745) (N = 2,053) (N = 2,053)  (N = 1,249) (N = 1,249)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (3) – (4) (6) (7) (8) = (6) – (7) 
Cumulative 5-
day  return 
across 3 events  
–0.0256 –0.0260 –0.0250 –0.0171 –0.0079 
(2.74 **) 
–0.0222 –0.0151 –0.0071 













2.16 1.73 2.46 2.38 0.08 
(1.13     ) 
2.67 2.59 0.08 
(1.02     ) 






After Matching  
Sample for  
Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept ? –0.0714  (1.80 *  ) –0.0496  (2.35 **  ) 
Treatment + / – –0.0101  (2.68 **) –0.0120  (2.72 **  ) 
Log(MCap) + / – 0.0025  (1.72 *  ) 0.0040  (1.89 *    ) 
MTB + / – 0.0010  (2.81 **) 0.0016  (4.93 ***) 
N  4,106 2,498 
Adj-R
2
  0.020 0.015 
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This table presents univariate comparisons.   
 
Panel A presents average effects of the aggregated market reactions to events affecting passage of the mandated nonfinancial 
disclosures in the European Union.  Columns (1) and (2) present the treatment (N = 2,417) and control (N = 9,745) samples prior to 
matching.  Columns (3) and (4) present the treatment (N = 2,053) and control (N = 2,053) samples used in the univariate analysis after 
matching.  Columns (6) and (7) present the treatment (N = 1,249) and control (N = 1,249) samples used in the cross-sectional analyses 
after matching.  Columns (5) and (8) present differences between the matched treatment and control samples.  The first row presents 
the average cumulative 5-day raw return to the aggregated three events identified as affecting the likelihood of passage for the 
directive mandating increased nonfinancial disclosures in the EU.  The second row presents the average market capitalization, in $ 
millions at fiscal year-end.  The third row presents the average market-to-book ratio, as of the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Panel B presents average effects controlling for (i) Log(MCap) (the log of market capitalization in $ millions at fiscal year-end) and 
(ii) MTB (the market-to-book ratio as of the fiscal year-end).  The experimental variable is Treatment, an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm is required to adopt the mandated nonfinancial disclosures in the EU (i.e., a treatment firm), and zero otherwise (i.e., a 
control firm).  Standard errors are clustered by country. 
 






Panel A.  Descriptive Data (N = 1,249) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev  Variable Mean Median Std Dev 
CAR  –0.007 –0.006 0.088  MCAP_BotQ 0.250 0.000 0.433 
ESG_Discl_Score 30.187 27.273 16.742  Ind_Max_ESGDiscl 56.885 59.504 8.818 
Govern_Score 6.429 6.400 2.690  Ind_Avg_ROA 5.069 5.367 2.369 
Soc_Score 4.627 4.500 1.781  EnvWeight 35.358 32.000 20.293 
Environ_Score 5.473 5.400 2.205  CommonLaw  0.728 1.000 0.445 
Asset_Mgr 75.979 86.635 24.157  RegQual 1.413 1.258 0.282 
Asset_Owner 3.884 3.086 6.115  NationalReg 0.055 0.000 0.229 
MTB_TopQ 0.250 0.000 0.433      
 
Panel B.  Correlations (N = 1,249) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1)   CAR 1.000              
(2)   ESG_Discl_Score 0.032 1.000             
(3)   Govern_Score 0.108 0.013 1.000            
(4)   Soc_Score 0.001 0.156 0.041 1.000           
(5)   Environ_Score 0.034 0.080 –0.021 0.118 1.000          
(6)   Asset_Mgr 0.073 –0.175 0.140 –0.151 –0.017 1.000         
(7)   Asset_Owner 0.067 0.091 0.009 –0.009 0.025 –0.064 1.000        
(8)   MTB_TopQ 0.064 –0.082 0.076 –0.044 0.064 0.103 –0.023 1.000       
(9)   MCAP_BotQ –0.012 –0.007 –0.017 0.012 –0.115 –0.122 –0.086 –0.090 1.000      
(10) Ind_Max_ESGDiscl –0.085 0.103 0.018 0.043 –0.224 –0.038 0.063 –0.082 –0.163 1.000     
(11) Ind_Avg_ROA 0.056 0.000 0.019 –0.089 0.083 0.062 –0.039 0.268 –0.039 –0.114 1.000    
(12) EnvWeight 0.018 0.117 0.181 0.101 –0.231 –0.072 0.007 –0.050 –0.025 0.269 –0.033 1.000   
(13) CommonLaw  0.033 –0.250 0.104 –0.219 –0.090 0.548 –0.130 0.187 0.033 –0.090 0.038 –0.047 1.000  
(14) RegQual –0.087 0.126 0.049 0.135 0.071 –0.092 –0.022 0.039 0.272 –0.039 0.026 –0.004 0.093 1.000 
(15) NationalReg –0.024 0.101 –0.047 0.163 0.065 –0.261 –0.135 –0.067 –0.042 0.042 0.038 0.049 –0.395 –0.106 
    
This table presents descriptive statistics.  The sample (N = 1,249) is observations for the cross-sectional analyses using the treatment 
observations matched on country-sector.  Panel A presents descriptive data (means, medians, and standard deviations).  Panel B 









Variable Coefficient t-stat 
   
   Intercept ? 0.01955 (0.49) 
Firm-Level Variables: 
   
   ESG_Discl_Score + / – 0.00030 (2.53) ** 
   Govern_Score + / – 0.00311 (2.71) ** 
   Soc_Score + / – 0.00094 (0.77) 
   Environ_Score + / – 0.00087 (0.81) 
   Asset_Mgr + 0.00019 (1.13) 
   Asset_Owner + 0.00104 (2.70) ** 
   MTB_TopQ + 0.00925 (1.61) * 
   MCAP_BotQ – 0.00537 (0.89) 
Industry-Level Variables: 
   
   Ind_Max_ESGDiscl – –0.00090 (2.60) ** 
   Ind_Avg_ROA – 0.00134 (1.21) 
   EnvWeight – 0.00013 (0.51) 
Country-Level Variables: 
   
   CommonLaw  + 0.00254 (0.21) 
   RegQual – –0.03484  (2.42) ** 
   NationalReg + / – –0.00310 (0.13) 
    
N  1,249 
Adj-R
2
  0.034 
    
This table presents results of our multivariate analyses examining the cross-sectional 
determinants of the market reactions to events affecting passage of the mandated nonfinancial 
disclosures in the European Union.   
 
The dependent variable is CARi, the cumulative abnormal return for firm i to the aggregated 
three events identified as affecting the likelihood of passage for the directive mandating 
increased nonfinancial disclosures in the EU.  Each firm i return is adjusted for that from a 
matched control firm.  Matching is done by country and sector, as well as a propensity score 
match using the market-to-book ratio and market capitalization.   
 
All experimental variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
***, **, * represent significance for the indicated one-tailed or two-tailed tests. 




Sensitivity Analyses: Alternative Matching and Samples 
 
 Country-Sector Match with 
Size Difference Minimization 
 
Country-Industry Match 
Country-Sector Match  
Excluding US Observations 
 
Panel A.  Average Effects 


















 (N = 746) (N = 746)  (N = 857) (N = 857)  (N = 647) (N = 647)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cumulative 5-day  
    raw return  
    across 3 events  
–0.0191 –0.0122 –0.0070  
(2.75 ***) 
–0.0194 –0.0113 –0.0081 
 (2.14 **) 
–0.0342 –0.0163 –0.0179  
(4.12 ***) 
Market Capitalization 12,261 9,646 2,651 
(2.01 **) 
12,108 8,223 3,885 
(2.92 **) 
12,231 5,943 6,288 
(5.63 ***) 
Market-to-Book 2.32 2.23 0.09 
(1.04) 
2.72 2.62 0.10 
(1.11) 
2.31 2.14 0.17 
(1.18) 
 











  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  ? –0.0080  (1.34     ) –0.0164  (0.56     ) –0.0358  (1.70 *  ) 
Treatment + / – –0.0098  (2.62 **) –0.0093  (2.81 **) –0.0228  (2.77 **) 
Log(MCap) + / – 0.0009  (0.62     ) 0.0006  (0.48     ) 0.0025  (1.09     ) 
MTB + / – 0.0013  (1.91 *  ) 0.0003  (1.89 *  ) 0.0012  (1.66     ) 
N  1,492 1,714 1,294 
Adj-R
2





 Country-Sector Match with 
Size Difference Minimization 
 
Country-Industry Match 
Country-Sector Match  
Excluding US Observations 
 












  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  ? 0.03623  (1.09       ) 0.02913  (1.03       ) –0.09418  (1.94 *    ) 
Firm-level Variables:    
ESG_Discl_Score + / – 0.00039  (2.50 **  ) 0.00032  (2.46 **  ) 0.00039  (2.44 **  ) 
Govern_Score + / – 0.00241  (2.17 **  ) 0.00039  (0.41       ) 0.00552  (4.30 ***) 
Soc_Score + / – –0.00026  (0.34       ) –0.00087  (0.45       ) 0.00312  (1.86 **  ) 
Environ_Score + / – 0.00261  (1.32       ) 0.00174  (4.27 ***) 0.00223  (0.96       ) 
Asset_Mgr + 0.00027  (0.60       ) 0.00006  (0.26       ) 0.00010  (0.55       ) 
Asset_Owner + 0.00101  (2.42 **  ) 0.00136  (2.69 **  ) 0.00082  (2.51 **  ) 
MTB_TopQ + 0.00927  (1.65 *    ) 0.01336  (0.99       ) 0.01858  (1.79 *    ) 
MCAP_BotQ – 0.00836  (1.33       ) –0.01441  (1.28       ) 0.00992  (1.35       ) 
Industry-level Variables:    
Ind_Max_ESGDiscl – –0.00068  (4.01 ***) –0.00013  (0.61       ) –0.00014  (0.18       ) 
Ind_Avg_ROA – –0.00003  (0.04       ) –0.00052  (0.22       ) –0.00097  (0.53       ) 
EnvWeight – –0.00008  (0.29       ) –0.00007  (0.35       ) 0.00026  (0.50       ) 
Country-level Variables:    
CommonLaw  + –0.00287  (0.20       ) 0.01529  (1.29       ) –0.01941  (1.21       ) 
RegQual – –0.02904  (2.10 *    ) –0.04705  (3.14 ***) –0.00339  (0.15       ) 
NationalReg + / – –0.00667  (1.99 *    ) –0.01227  (0.26       ) –0.00303  (0.15       ) 
N  746 857 647 
Adj-R
2
  0.029 0.021 0.032 
53 
 
    
This table presents sensitivity analyses.  Across all panels, we examine three alternative samples.  First, we present a country-sector 
match with a more restrictive size difference minimization; the treatment and control samples each include N = 746 (total N = 1,492).  
Second, we present a country-industry match, which is more restrictive than matching on sector.  The treatment and control samples 
each include N = 857 (total N = 1,714).  Third, we exclude observations domiciled in the US, the country having the highest 
representation in our sample.  The treatment and control samples each include N = 647 (total N = 1,294).   
 
Panel A presents average effects of the aggregated market reactions to events affecting passage of the mandated nonfinancial 
disclosures in the European Union across the three alternative treatment and control samples.  Columns (1) – (3) present comparisons 
across the country-sector match with more restrictive size difference minimization; Columns (4) – (6) present comparisons across the 
country-industry match; and Columns (7) – (9) present comparisons excluding US observations.  The first row presents the average 
cumulative 5-day raw return to the aggregated three events identified as affecting the likelihood of passage for the directive mandating 
increased nonfinancial disclosures in the EU.  The second row presents the average market capitalization, in $ millions at fiscal year-
end.  The third row presents the average market-to-book ratio, as of the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Panel B presents average effects controlling for (i) Log(MCap) (the log of market capitalization in $ millions at fiscal year-end) and 
(ii) MTB (the market-to-book ratio as of the fiscal year-end).  The experimental variable is Treatment, an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm is required to adopt the mandated nonfinancial disclosures in the EU (i.e., a treatment firm), and zero otherwise (i.e., a 
control firm).  Standard errors are clustered by country. 
 
Panel C presents the multivariate results.  Standard errors are clustered by country. 
 
***, **, * represent significance for the indicated one or two-tailed tests of differences.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  
